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Book Reviews 
Interpreting Ladies: Women, Wit, and Morality in the Restoration Comedy of Man-
ners by Pat Gill. Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1994. Pp. ix + 209. 
$35.00. 
The deliberate ambiguity of her book's clever title indicates the dual focus 
of Professor Gill's feminist examination of the Restoration comedy of man-
ners. On the one hand, this book considers how male playwrights portrayed 
women on stage as the objects of male definition and desire~the ways in 
which "ladies" were interpreted by men. On the other, it attends to how 
male playwrights, particularly Wycherley and Congreve, imagined women 
as auditors, constructing "ladies" who actively interpreted the theatre and its 
representations of women. Though both types of "interpreting ladies" are 
male projections, Gill uses them to argue convincingly that the Restoration 
comedy of manners "revolves around the female figure as the prototype of 
problematic signification .... women are at once the perfect reifications of, 
and the destabilizing factors in, moral discourse" (19). According to Gill, a 
feminist critique of Restoration comedy is therefore crucial to an informed 
understanding of the satiric and dramatic significance of that comedy, and 
she concludes Interpreting Ladies with a consideration of the ways in which 
Aphra Behn provides provocative and revealing alternatives to her male col-
leagues' characterizations of female desire. 
Freud plays a particularly important role in Gill's analysis of the issues 
raised by "interpreting ladies" on the Restoration stage. Using his discussion 
of jokes, Gill maintains that satiric comedy fuses Freud's two varieties of the 
tendentious joke, the hostile and the obscene, creating a verbal seduction in 
which male aggression triumphs over female weakness. According to Gill, 
women can never perpetrate these jokes-indeed, lithe woman becomes the 
necessarily excluded object of the joke" (ll)-but can ouly be their victims, 
for the conclusion of manners comedy invariably depends on the public ex-
posure of private female sexual activity. Women become the butt of the sa-
tiric joke that structures the comic plot, their vulnerability and passivity 
reinstating the masculine integrity, privilege, and subjectiVity that have been 
questioned in the course of the play. 
Gil1 also uses Freud to analyze male projections of their theatrical audi-
ences. Looking at both Wycherley's dedication to The Plain Dealer and Con-
greve's dedication to The Double Dealer, Gill argues that "knowledge, 
especially sexual knowledge, is a gendered acquisition: only men are prop-
erly in possession of it" (p. 1). Both male playwrights imagine ideal female 
spectators as women who should be entertained by seeing themselves as ob-
jects of male desire, but who at the same time should not compromise their 
virtue by recognizing sexual innuendo or double meanings. Gill quite as-
tutely recognizes that this impossible situation returns us to the scene of 
Freud's obscene joke: "It is the hostile verbal undressing-in the Freudian 
scenario, the revelation of (the lack of) genitalia-that puts the woman back 
in her place as object, a place that she, in the course of the joke, momentarily 
manages to escape by her initial temporary refusal of the sexual invitation" 
(12). Wycherley and Congreve ask for a female audience capable of respond-
ing to the playwright's jokes even while the women must be too "innocent" 
to understand them. 
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Gill presents her Freudian framework in the book's introduction, which is 
followed by individual chapters devoted to Etherege, Wycherley, Congreve, 
and Behn. Her attention to specific plays and playwrights allows Gill to re-
fine the initial formulations of her introduction, and each chapter develops a 
number of exciting observations and insights. She uses Etherege, for in-
stance, to reveal the way in which the heroine of the comedy of manners, by 
reflecting the hero's behavior, desire, and witty attitudes, functions as a 
"superb patriarchal fantasy" who acts primarily to produce and excite male 
desire. Her discussion of The Country Wife in chapter two persuasively 
argues that Wycherley's play has engendered contradictory critical responses 
because it exemplifies the very linguistic and moral ambiguities that it wants 
to condemn. Her extended critique of Congreve demonstrates how the links 
that playwright draws between loose women, illicit sexual activity, and the 
act of interpretation govern his failed attempts to define a "proper feminine 
discourse." Finally, Gill presents Behn as a "protofeminist" who illuminates 
a very different attitude to the conventions of Restoration comedy, for in 
Belm "chastity is not a criterion for female heroic status" (141), the "thematic 
of reciprocal enjoyment" (141) is primary, and "women's interpretive knowl-
edge and skill are always a given and never an issue" (151). 
Interpreting Ladies is a valuable addition to the critical literature on the 
Restoration comedy of manners, though J think it could have been even 
more useful and important had Gill been rather more ambitious and aggres-
sive in formulating and developing her arguments. I lament, for instance, 
her decision to assemble the usual suspects, a line-up of Wycherley, Ether-
ege, and Congreve enlivened only by the presence of Behn (who has herself 
achieved canonical status in the last five years). I must confess to a sense of 
ennui as I made my way, once again, through discussions of the standard 
plays by the standard playwrights. Even more problematic is the book's re-
fusal to look beyond the Restoration stage, to establish a denser social and 
cultural context for the sexual polities that Gill wants to locate in the theatri-
cal world. Early on Gill insists that the sexual tensions she will address 
"indicate a particular historical anxiety about the traditional definition of 
masculinity, an anxiety concomitant with the rise of the bourgeois class and 
the prospect of social mobility" (13). But her book rarely examines this 
"particular historical anxiety" or attempts to go beyond cliches about a rising 
bourgeois class. This book, in fact, can hardly address these issues since it so 
studiously ignores historical particulars; all four dramatists are treated as 
"Restoration" playwrights who appear to inhabit precisely the same histori-
cal moment. And the same theaters as well, for also absent from this book is 
any consideration of changing theatrical conditions. This seems particularly 
llllfortunate in an argument that might quite usefully have considered 
women both as audience and performers, distancing itself from male projec-
tions and considering precisely how living women worked and took plea-
sure in the theatre. 
Interpreting Ladies, in short, is about literary texts and not theatrical scripts, 
and though I regret the absence of a more specific dramatic and historical 
context for Gill's argwnent, I nonetheless admire its liveliness, careful read-
ing, and rhetorical sophistication. The field of Restoration drama has long 
lacked a sustained feminist critique and this book should prove a stimulat-
I 
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ing catalyst to arguments about the place of women in the comedy of man-
ners. 
University of Alabama Harold Weber 
Swift's Politics: A Study in Disaffection by Ian Higgins. Cambridge, U.K.: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1994. Pp. xiii + 232. $54.95. 
Emphasizing the extremist and subversive elements in Swift's writings, 
Higgins makes an interesting and provocative, though less than convincing, 
case for Swift's having been, if not a Jacobite per se, someone with strong 
Jacobite sympathies and associations. The book's main strength lies in its 
skillful marshalling of passages from Swift's texts-both canonical and little-
known-that serve to spotlight a powerful strain of disaffection with the sta-
tus quo and an imaginative engagement with revolutionary alternatives. The 
emphasis placed on these aspects of Swift's writings helps to effectively 
counter the view, put forward in various recent (as well as not-so-recent) 
critical works, of Swift as a Whig and/ or a political moderate who fully em-
braced the settlement of 1688 and who remained in essence a loyal supporter 
of established authority. The safely defanged and declawed public figure 
who emerges from these works is (happily, if not, alas, once and for all) put 
to rest by Higgins's insistence upon fixing our attention on those utterances 
of Swift's that landed his printers in court or in jail, that fell victim to censor-
ship because of their infiammatory nature, or that functioned as dangerously 
provocative allusions to contemporary affalrs. This study does a commenda-
ble job on the whole of supporting its contention that Swift was "an unset-
tling, extremist political writer" who "wr[oteJ in the language of the 
dispossessed and proscribed" (45, 11). The question remains, however, 
whether these characteristics necessarily testify to Jacobite sentiments. Was 
Jacobitism, in other words, the only form of extremism in Swift's time, and 
were there no other ideological positions available to the period's diSpos-
sessed and/or proscribed? It is in conSidering such questions that we come 
up against the main weakness of the book's argument. 
Not that this argument is easily summarized, given the way it shuttles 
somewhat uncertainly among a number of different formulations, ranging 
from highly tentative suggestions of Swift's possible Jacobite ties to unequiv-
ocal claims for the latter's existence. Thus we move from the admission that 
"Whether or not Swift was a Jacobite cannot be determined" (ix) and the 
cautionary observation that IJIf in fact he was a Jacobite, he did not commit 
explicit incriminating evidence to paper" (74), to the diffident conjecture that 
Swift "may have had, from time to time, conditional Jacobite sympathies" 
(45), to more forceful assertions about the existence of Jacobite Tory lan-
guage in Swift's writings and to testaments to his advocacy of Jacobite 
causes: "Swift's tacit support for the Jacobite projects of military invasion 
and insurrection in 1715, 1717, and 1719 may be legitimately inferred" (84). 
One gets the impression that Higgins desperately wants to make the 
stronger case for Swift's Jacobitism-that, after all, is the raison d'etre of his 
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book, and the conclusion toward which much of his argument irresistibly 
tends-but that he is too careful a scholar, and too sensitive a reader of texts 
(and contexts), to conveniently ignore the ambiguities of the evidence. On 
the positive side, this caution results in a more nuanced study that avoids 
the pitfalls of an overly narrow, inflexibly-imposed thesis. 
A less positive result, however, is that when this stronger case is made, it 
is conveyed tluough insinuation and innuendo rather than through forceful 
argumentation that bespeaks authorial conviction. Thus Higgins invariably 
places the tag "Jacobite" or "Jacobite Tory" before the name of anyone he re-
fers to who had even the slightest connection with Swift, subtly creating a 
"guilt by association" ambience in which Swift in effect stands "convicted" 
of Jacobitism merely because he knew many people who were either them-
selves J acobites or (like him, and wi.th equal inconclusiveness) accused of 
being so by various of their contemporaries. That Swift's circle included a 
significant number sympathetic to the Jacobite cause is indisputable. The 
problem is that Higgins tends to ignore the fact that, especially given the 
specific configuration of Irish affairs, Swift formed bonds of alliance with 
men across the entire ideological spectrum, including ardent Whigs such as 
Archbishop William King and Lord Robert Molesworth, the latter of whose 
patriotic exertions on behalf of Ireland prompted Swift to declare, "I am not 
a Stranger to his Lordship; and, excepting in what relates to the Church, 
there are few Persons with whose Opinions I am better pleased to agree." 
One would be hard put to imagine "Opinions" more at odds with basic Ja-
cobite principles than those of this Anglo-Irish peer whose writings so 
greatly influenced the major architects of the American Revolution. 
Another example of the book's "conviction by innuendo" may be seen in 
the inordinate importance given to the accusations of Swift's alleged Jacobite 
affiliations circulated during his lifetime. Through aimost imperceptible slip-
pages in tone and emphasis, such accusations at times themselves assume 
the primary burden of evidence for Swift's Jacobite leanings. That Swift "was 
regularly convicted of Jacobitism in the press" (92) and that "his Whig ad-
versaries came to regard him as 'a great Jacobite'" (ix) is certainly true-but 
then, the judgments made by these "adversaries" and by the (predOminantly 
Whig) press were by their very nature biased against Swift and intended to 
smear his reputation. To invoke them as evidence of Swift's political stance 
is tantamount to using items from The Craftsman to construct a well-balanced 
picture of Walpole's administration, or like citing the insinuations of the 
House Committee on Un-American Activities during the early 1950s to 
prove that someone was a Communist. Higgins is clearly aware of the prob-
lem and makes some effort to navigate around its pitfalls, but there are too 
many places where he seemingly can't resist the temptation to press the 
statements of Swift's enemies into the direct service of his argument. Hig-
gins's endeavor in this regard is not helped by the fact that Swift was 
acutely aware of this very problem (i.e., of mere accusation being made to 
function as proof of guilt, especially vis-it-vis the political aspersions levelled 
by the Whig establishment against its opponents), and interspersed his writ-
ings with scathing, often satirical exposures of this practice. In An Examina-
tion of Certain Abuses, Corruptions, and Enormities, in the City of Dublin, for 
example, he mercilessly mocks his foes' ability to find evidence of Jacobitical 
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utterances and activities in even the most mundane, innocuous aspects of 
Dublin life. These pointed critiques have the effect of placing all arguers for 
Swift's Jacobitism-whether in his own time or in ours-at risk for being 
perceived as legitimate targets of his angry protests or ridicule. 
Higgins is most successful at eluding the line of Swift's critical fire when 
he formulates his claims in the following manner: "Attention to the possible 
polemical provenance and resonance of some of Swift's political statements 
allows us to understand how a contemporary might have construed Swift's 
political discourse as the speech act of a disaffected Tory" (26); "Swift's 'Rev-
olution-principle' is not without certain ambivalence and could easily be 
construed as covert Jacobite politics if readers felt the present grievances 
were insupportable" (82). These observations raise important issues deserv-
ing of lengthy and careful consideration. But to do full justice to them, one 
would have to move away from the somewhat less-than-productive question 
that occupies center stage in this study-Was Swift a Jacobite, and what evi-
dence can we use to prove it?-and instead address ourselves to other, po-
tentially more fruitful questions: What is it about Swift's political prose that 
appealed so strongly to the disaffected in his society? How did the difterent 
kinds of political grievances held by his diverse readership produce dispar-
ate understandings of his writings? To what extent was Swift able to con-
sciously control and shape the polemical resonance of his statements? How 
responsible was he for the way in which his readers interpreted his texts? To 
attempt answers to these questions would require a degree of theoretical re-
flection that is (unfortunately) absent from the present study, with its appar-
ent assumption that empirically-oriented historical. investigations are 
sufficient by themselves to explain matters of textual politics, meaning, and 
interpretation. 
Higgins is on firmer ground when he turns for substantiation of his thesis 
to certain rhetorical and thematic parallels between Swift's political dis-
course and Jacobite writings. His comments in this regard yield some reveal-
ing insights into Swift's marked attraction to ideas of regicide and 
tyrannicide, as well as to notions of justified rebellion and assassination. On 
various occasions, Higgins's juxtapOSitions of Swift'" s radical utterances 
alongside those of contemporary Jacobite polemicists do indicate points of 
unmistakable congruence. Yet here too there are problems with the kinds of 
conclusions drawn from the evidence presented. For one thing, it is possible 
to understand such congruence in light of the fact that, as Higgins himself 
puts it, "Jacobitism provided a political rhetoric of militant opposition that 
could be appropriated and deployed in [Swift's] political satire" (166-67)-
quite conceivably for non-Jacobite ends, just as in the 1720s "Jacobite Tory 
appropriation of Old Whig languages" (33) was used to promote a largely 
non-Whig agenda. 
Moreover, J.G.A. Pocock's analysis of eighteenth-century political dis-
course, showing how ideological opponents often invoked the same ethical 
norms and political ideals for very different ends-not to mention the recent 
spotlight thrown on right-wing militia groups whose anti-government dia-
tribes closely echo the liberationist rhetoric of 1960s' left-wing activists-
should remind us that neither rhetorical parallels nor the appeal to similar 
political concerns necessarily reflects membership in the same party (literally 
-----~-------~----------------------"1 
156 Criticism, Vol. XXXVIII, No.1: Book Reviews 
or figuratively speaking). By the same token, that Swift shared certain griev-
ances and interests with Jacobite writers does not automatically attest to his 
embrace of their basic ideological assumptions or political agenda. Thus 
Swift's belief in legislative defeasibility and his monarchomach rhetoric 
would have been at least as appealing to "left-wing" elements as to "right-
wing" ones (I am, of course, using these admittedly anachronistic terms very 
loosely, merely as a form of shorthand due to time and space limitations). 
Indeed, a generation earlier, the radical Whig Algernon Sidney-executed for 
sedition in 1683-had forcefully argued for the legitimacy of popular revolt 
against an unresponsive monarch, articulating ideas that were eagerly taken 
up throughout the following century by a variety of republican and revolu-
tionary thinkers. It is telling (and hardly coincidental) that Swift, speaking as 
the Drapier, chose to include Sidney as one of the "dangerous Authors" who 
inspired his own political protests because they "talk of Liberty as a Blessing, 
to which the whole Race of Mankind hath an Original Title; whereof nothing but 
unlawful Force can divest them." Passages such as this one remind us that 
Swift's "extremism," assuming a variety of forms throughout his writings, 
could appear in contexts that had greater affinities with radical Lockean 
ideas than with the aggrieved feelings of High-Church Tory Jacobites. 
All of which helps to point up what I see as the main problem with the 
book's argument: i.e., its apparent assumption that during this period Jacobi-
tism was "the only show in town" when it came to expressing political dis-
affection, resistance, and/or desire for change, and its consequent inability to 
so much as imagine any other conceptual framework(s) for Swift's subver-
sive attitudes. In the world presupposed by this study, revolution is equata-
ble with reaction and all radical political articulations are necessarily 
backward-looking, founded on the hope of a restored past rather than a re-
configured present or a newly-created future. I would argue that such an as-
sumption ignores the range of dissident and counter-hegemonic views 
during Swift's time-more specifically, fails to recognize the existence of pro-
gressive forms of political critique and resistance (as documented most nota-
bly in Caroline Robbins's pioneering study on "The Eighteenth-Century 
Comrnonwealthman"). 
This problem is closely related to the other major shortcoming of the book: 
its application of political labels and analyses that have much more specific 
relevance to English affairs of the time than to the situation in Ireland. To his 
credit (and unlike many other writers on Swift), Higgins does acknowledge 
Swift's Irish milieu and makes some attempt to weigh its possible effect on 
Swift's outlook as an Anglican churchman. Nevertheless, his singleminded 
focus on Jacobite contexts-along with his frequent deployment of interpre-
tations and scenarios by now familiar from the "Jacobite industry'ffs treat-
ment of Pope and his circle-cannot escape bringing a decidedly 
Anglocentric perspective to his treatment of Swift's politics. Particularly 
damaging is the way this treatment excludes any serious consideration of the 
nationalist and anti-colonialist dimensions of Swift's thought and writings, 
hence fails to show how even those attitudes Swift shared with Jacobites 
could in his case convey a very different set of nuances and assume genu-
inely revolutionary, rather than just radically reactionary, significance. 
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Thus, for example, Higgins is quite right to insist on the often barely sup-
pressed hostility Swift revealed toward King William III and the Glorious 
Revolution, despite the well-known instances (such as in his January 10, 1721 
letter to Pope) where he firmly declared his adherence to the Revolution 
principle; and obviously this hostility was a characteristic he had in common 
with Jacobite sympathizers. But what is left out of this picture-as his Max-
ims Controlled in Ireland makes amply clear in its scathing portrayal of the 
Wi1liamite Wars as a "contention of the British empire" that ravaged the 
Irish countryside, turning it into a "desert" -is the fact that, as an Irishman, 
Swift had particular reasons to be critical of both William's militaristic ad-
ventures and of the Revolution: reasons that must be illlderstood quite sepa-
rately from the ones put forward in Jacobite literature. Similarly, Higgins's 
insistence that we view Swift's obsessive concern with "loyalty" in a Jacobiti-
cal context, while it can conceivably offer some useful insight into, say, The 
Memoirs of Captain Creichton, overlooks the ways in which it functions in his 
sermons and Irish tracts as a specific call to Irish patriotism: a demand for 
fidelity, not to a dethroned monarch or sacred royal line, but to lithe Life and 
Being of [one's] Political Mother," abused and threatened by a powerful, un-
scrupulous neighbor. Then there is the book's treatment of the passage in 
Gulliver's Travels depicting the Lindalinians' revolt. Higgins sees this depic-
tion as one of the many instances in which the work "entertain[s] recognized 
Jacobite alternative options-[in this case] ideas of resistance and tyranni-
cide," the passage having remained unpublished during Swift's lifetime be-
cause "it would have appeared militantly Jacobitical to the English Whig 
authorities" (171, 158). However, as a veiled allusion to. Ireland's successful 
opposition to the English authorities in the Wood's halfpence affair, the rep-
resentation of the Lindalinians' triumphant rebellion would likely have been 
deemed inflammatory for reasons having more to do with Anglo-Irish power 
struggles than with Jacobite politics, and its "ideas of resistance and tyrarmi-
cide" might well have seemed prophetic of a future upheaval more threaten-
ing even than Jacobite unrest (which had, after all, been decisively quelled in 
all the previous instances it manifested itself militarily). One could point to a 
number of other examples-the treatment of the motifs of rape, prostitution, 
and cannibalism in Swift's writings, for instance-where imagistic elements 
central to Swift's texts are divested of their Irish nationalist contexts (not to 
mention their anti-colonialist rhetorical force) and assimilated to an exclu-
sively Jacobite script. 
These shortcomings in the book's argument are particularly regrettable in 
light of Higgins's success in presenting a persuasive, at times eloquent re-
minder of the extent to which Swift was a profoundly destabiliZing and un-
settling writer whose works exerted at the time of their initial publication 
Gust as they continue to exert today) a peculiar resistance to all attempts at 
moderating their extremism and bringing them into the bounds of propriety. 
However, the reductive application of a Jacobite framework-ultimately de-
signed, like the interpretations it attacks, to impose tight definitional control 
over the intractable energies of Swift's texts-is hardly the way to do justice 
to this fundamental inSight. VVhat is called for, instead, is a receptivity to the 
multiple layers of Swift's subversive vein, which include his demystifying 
reflections on all kings (not only the post-Stuart ones), his withering denunci-
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<1tions of militarism and empire-building {not merely of the standing armies 
that were the bCtcs Iloires of Tories and Jacobites}, his satiric exposures of the 
fundilmental grounds of social hierarchy, and his trenchant attacks on En-
gland's policies vis-a.-vis Ireland. 
Ulliversity of California, Riverside Carole Fabricant 
The Life of Walter Scott: A Critical Biography by John Sutherland. Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1995. Pp. xi + 386,13 illus. $34.95. 
The conjunction of biographer and subject here seems promising: John 
Sutherland, respected analyst of the nineteenth-century publishing trade in 
fiction, meets Walter Scott, whose hugely popular Waverley Novels changed 
the WJY in which fiction was not only written but published in the last cen-
tury. One expects a detailed sense of the workings of the trade in Scott's 
time, shrewd insights into the significance of innovative publishing forms 
like the "three-decker" or the "collected works" pioneered or established by 
the Waverley Novels, and in general a more thorough awareness than in 
most literary biographies of writing as a particular-and complicated-busi-
ness. But one gets little of this. Something seems to have gone wrong in this 
biographical encounter, and the book that has resulted displays few of the 
strengths of either Sutherland or Scott. 
In part the problem may be a matter of genre. Sutherland's volume is in 
the series of Blackwell Critical Biographies, a series based on already pub-
lished biographical material and not on original, archival research. This 
me<lns that the Blackwell biographer has to carve out a space for the new bi-
ography from the old biographies, in itself a matter of delicate critical nego-
tiation. In general, such reorientation is most usefully achieved in one of two 
\vays: one may bring into playa new theoretical model of life-and-works or 
one mJY move into the foreground a substantial rereading of the works, ef-
fecting in the process some redefinition of the accepted connection between 
this <tuthor's life and works. The Blackwell series as a whole has opted for 
the second option, its general blurb (printed on the back cover of Suther-
land's text) making the point that the volumes offer "substantial critical dis-
cussion" of the works and "intelligent criticism within a well-researched 
biographical context." Sutherland himself, however, seems to have a rather 
different sense of what J "critical biography" might mean. His discussions of 
Scott's works <lre brief and reductive, and he concentrates instead on criti-
ci:-;m of existing biogrJphies or, more precisely, on criticism of the laudatory 
inl<1ge of Scott constructed in the stand<lrd biographies of John Gibson Lock-
hllrt and EdgJr Johnson, deriving much of his own ammunition from Eric 
Qu,wle's L'mbittefed The [:?lIiIJ of Sir Wnltcr Scott. 
Tllis kind of appwJch const(tutes <l third option for the second-order biog-
r.lplll'r, ,1 debunking gcnl'rclted by the impulse of demystification (rather 
(11.111, :-;'1~·, b~· the discm'l>ry of new inform<1tion). Such an impulse can pro-
dUl'l' t'rL'~h .md cxciting wnrk, but it can also (as in this cllse) appear carping 
,1I1d !l1l,.m-~piritL'd, a ~tr'lining <lftl'r negllti\'e reading. In his account of Scott, 
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Sutherland depends heavily on hypothetical and conditional formulations 
(the prose is filled with "may have's" and "would have's"); on sly inferences 
(as in the hints that Scott's son Charles may have been gay); and on insinua-
tion (formulations like "It would be unkind to suggest"). Accordingly, his 
arguments tend to be arguments-by-contamination, as in the analysis of a 
potential collaboration between Scott and the poet Tom Campbell in 1805. 
TI1is particular story forms part of a more general account of Scott's relations 
with editorial collaborators early in his career, an account whose main pur-
pose is to undercut Scott's well-established reputation for literary generosity. 
The Scott-Campbell relationship is set up by an unpleasant story regarding 
Scott's displacement of Edward Forster's edition of Dryden: first he lured 
Forster away from his own project by proposing they jointly edit Dryden, 
then he engineered the erasure of Forster altogether, so that the Dryden edi-
tion came out under only Scott's name. Whatever the merit of these allega-
tions, the symptomatic point is what follows, for Sutherland goes on to claim 
that what makes the Forster affair even worse is that "at exactly the same 
time [Scott] did much the same thing with Thomas Campbell" (129). He is 
referring to Scott's proposal to Constable for a multi-volumed edition of Brit-
ish poets when Campbell had agreed to a similar project with another pub-
lisher. Campbell withdrew from this other project, and accepted Scott's 
proposal for a collaborative venture, but the edition of poets never material-
ized since the publisher lost interest. Sutherland, however, insists on com-
pleting a guilty parallel with the Forster case: "But had [Scott] gone forward 
as originally planned in 1805, one cannot but tlUnk that Campbell would 
have gone the way of Forster" (130). 
Such eagerness to "get" Scott (and his standard biographers) is rather puz-
zling. If Sir Walter Scott still has a halo, it has long been obscured by layers 
of cobwebs; Lockhart's errors and biases are well known; and Edgar John-
son's humanistic brand of biography was old-fashioned even \vhen the Scoll 
biography appeared twenty-five years ago. This does not mean that the 
question of received constructions of Scott need not be raised. On the con-
trary. The field of romantic fiction is currently being redra\\'n under the pres-
sure of new critical questions and new models of history. And as the field is 
being redrawn, the Waverley Novels are once again becoming visible as sig-
nificant and complex fictions. Substantial chapters on Scott, for instance, are 
appearing with increasing frequency in studies of the period. Hence a re-
thinking of the \\'hole shape of Scott's career in the context of its O\vn time is 
very much a timely project, but Sutherland seems to have little interest in 
this kind of re-thinking. For him Scott's career is pretty much a product of 
the nastier qualities of both the \'I'riter and his readers: personal opportunism 
and ruthlessness on the one hand, and British vanities, prejudices and smug-
ness on the other. ''''hile there is something to this, it is not all there is to it, 
and the limitation of Sutherland's book is that it is so intent on rewriling 
Scott as exploitive, sycophantic and self-serving that the fiction becomes sim-
ply a reflex of such qualities. Thus Sutherland reads The Hearl of lvlidlofhiall 
as primarily a product of Scott's "addiction to things 'ro)'<1I.'" Dr<1wing at-
tention to "a greasily obsequious tone" in the sections dealing with QuC'cn 
Carolinc, Sutherland identifies as the moti\·c for the entire nO\·cl SC()tt'~ de-
sire to build an "elaborate compliment to his monarch's grandmother" (2()l/). 
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A similar reductiveness marks the literary commentary throughout. Waverley 
elicits sarcasm about the hero's comfortable survival; A Legend of Montrose 
generates much play about turncoats ("Scott himself ... had become an En-
glish knight-Sir Walter Turncoat," 227); while Ivanhoe leads to the comment 
that in this novel "Scott sowed the paranoid seeds for any number of twen-
tieth-century conspiracy fantasies" (232). The biography does include a smat-
tering of statements about Scott's generic innovations, prodigious literary 
energy, and historical significance, but such statements are perfunctory and 
bland. Nor is the negative commentary luueh more coherent, for it too seems 
rather scattershot. The books fails to convey a firm sense of Scott's cultural 
achievement, not only in the positive sense (which does not seem to interest 
Sutherland very much) but also in the negative sense that interests him 
more. If Sutherland offers suggestions and hints on this matter, he offers lit-
tle in the way of sustained argument. Given his knowledge and experience, 
the failure is all the more regrettable. The Tory advocate from Edinburgh 
who set in motion a profound literary revolution deserves a more considered 
analysis, and the "critical biography" of Scott for our time remains to be 
written. 
University of Ottawa Ina Ferris 
Imageless Truths: Shelley's Poetic Fictions by Karen Weisman. University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1994, Pp. xii + 227. $35.95. 
Shelley'S Satire: Violence, Exhortation, and Authority by Steven Jones. Normal: 
Northern Illinois University Press, 1994. Pp. xiv + 215. $30.00. 
Shelley'S early critics thought of him as a poet both in and in some way 
out of "the world." Modern critics do so as well, but they understand this 
dualism differently, and in their vocabulary Shelley'S poetry meditates on 
the possible autonomy of its own language, while claiming also language's 
grounding in the social and material realities it both mirrors and enriches. 
Though Shelley scholars today are a diverse lot, since the early 80's two 
general approaches have corne to dominate. In one view, for the Romantic 
lyric to claim to speak of a "world created by language" is to conceal rhetori-
cally language's inability to create much beyond endless iterations of its own 
conventions. If language is to articulate its own autonomy, clearly a number 
of paradoxes ensue, not least of which is the lack of real autonomy of the ac-
tual speaker from the given world or the conventions of form. In that case, 
language can only claim but never realize autonomy: how could autonomy 
from the given world even be thought outside the language needed to ex-
press it? Thus one group of Shelley scholars sees Shelley'S career as a con-
tinuing struggle over his poetry's need to point beyond itself, to express its 
world while also suggesting something greater, truer, not given in ordinary 
experience. As Karen Weisman puts it in Imageless Truths: Shelley'S Poetic Fic-
tions, Shelley comes to perceive "expressibility itself to be so large an issue 
that he claims it as the chief occupation of his life" (83). If this itself seems 
i 
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like a large critical clailnf it is one consonant with the interests of recent 
scholars like Tilottama Rajan and Jerrold Hogle. Shelley's career is seen as a 
series of dislocations, some radical in their revision of traditional theologies, 
literary genres, or theories of language; some truly disorienting, obsessive, 
haunting. As Rajan has recently written of Alastor, "tl1e complications of 
(seH)-representation produce a fear that what underlies language may be an 
abyss of meaning .... it oscillates between positing a transcendental signi-
fied accessible through lyric or allegory and seeing language as sub tended 
only by a vacancy" ("The Web of Human Things: Narrative and Identity in 
Alastor," in The New Shelley: Later Twentieth Century Views, ed. G. Kim Blank 
[New York: SI. Martin's Press, 1991], 107). 
At the same time, language is clearly a social act. Weisman herself sum-
marizes the emphasis of a second group of Shelley scholars when she re-
marks that "language as we normatively experience it ... exists only insofar 
as it is actualized ... and that actualization is only possible because commu-
nities publicly subscribe to certain shared assumptions about sounds and 
signs" (83). VVhile this view of language is not her own emphasis, she does 
understand this as a central practical concern of Shelley'S. For those critics 
who begin with these more pragmatic concerns, the origin (such critics are 
more willing to speak of origins) of Shelley'S obsession with language was 
his need to bring utopian vision or a hint of some ultimate good into the 
public sphere. There, without recourse to didactic reasoning, poetry might 
engage the heart and energize the will to act. Karen Weisman and Steven 
Jones represent these two diverse approaches to Shelley's career, and both of 
their books are filled with original, sometimes even startling insights. 
Karen Weisman's ambitious study explores these complex issues of lan-
guage and fictionality through which their multiple permutations across 
Shelley'S career, from Queen Mab to The Triumph of Life. For Weisman, Shel-
ley is pulled in the opposing directions of fiction making and fiction unmak-
ing, of questioning the very process of figuration through which poetry 
claims to point to a truth greater than, more intense than, more beautiful 
than, given experience. Some of this project will seem familiar to scholars 
aware of the work of Paul de Man, David Simpson, Rajan, and Hogle. But 
the distinctive strength of Weisman's book is in her shrewdly dialectical 
sense of Shelley's commitment to that given, "quotidian" experience which 
grounds all metaphoric elaboration. For Hogle, for example, Shelley'S shift-
ing imagery and self-referential metaphor is an element in a metaphysical 
project to undermine all fixed conceptual loci, the better to destabilize radi-
cally even such categories as "subject" and "object" in a continuing meta-
morphic process of representation, concealment, and displacement. 
Weisman, however, while presenting a view of Shelley'S imagery similar to 
Hogle's, attempts to be more sensitive to what she calls "the pressures of 
dailiness," Shelley's real urge to celebrate that fixed and determinate 
"thingness" through which we all move. "He could experience considerable 
anxiety over his troping of the world without oversimplifying the philosoph-
ical cruxes pertaining to the ontology of reality" (2). Though I think this is 
inelegantly written, it is a clear first premise leading to the other pole of her 
dialectic: that it was in fact Shelley's desire to transcend the empirical world 
and figure forth that transcendence which itself so often produces his sud-
------------------------------------------------------------------
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den guilt for and embracing of the everyday with its fixed and clear objects 
beautiful in themselves. Shelley, then, struggled "at once with both the ac-
tual and its problematizations" (2). 
In a sense this is a more pragmatic focus (on Shelley's real problems with 
visionary articulation) than we find in earlier linguistic-rhetorical critics, 
though in Weisman it is elaborately theorized. She offers a purpose for all the 
making and unmaking of fictions, namely, to disclose a more lucid relation 
between Shelley's imaginative forming and the world he would embrace. If 
this seems a paradoxical or self-nullifying career choice, that is because it is. 
Weisman's predecessors, as she is well aware, see Shelley's poetic language 
hanging over a void of its own creation; but in Weisman's account it is his 
poetic career, his progressive development of this problem, that seems to 
flirt with self-consuming annihilation-as the poet himself confesses in Weis-
man's reading of Epipsychidion ("Shelley goes with [Emily] to annihilation 
because he too has been consumed in his fiction of union" [131-32]). 
This reading follows a dialectic similar to that she had initiated with her 
analysis of Alastor, where Shelley's Poet figure "consumes himself into anni-
hilation by over-indulging his desire to transcend the spiritual aridity which, 
he believes, is the defining feature of the mutable world" (21). I found my-
self wondering, in later chapters, why after the triumphant mythologizing of 
Prometheus Unbound, Shelley himself would fall not so much into pessimism 
(for which there could always be a psychological explanation) but rather into 
the same epistemological culs-de-sac as in the poetry of four or five years be-
fore? From Weisman's critical perspective, the answer is the instability of the 
resolutions of Prometheus Unbound, which may always unravel. 
Her analysis of this poem is, I think, the book's central achievement, and 
while I find her conclusions not entirely satisfying they do represent an inge-
nious development of her argument and a shrewd sense of her place in the 
contemporary debate. She focuses on speech and speaking as the central ob-
sessions of the play. Yet much of that speech is-unspoken, reported, or only 
imagined by the "audience" /reader. While critics like Rajan and Susan 
Hawk Brisman have focused on this problem, Weisman's approach is more 
dialectical: she sees the paradoxes of represented speech here as a parallel 
problem to the dual nature of Prometheus himself, as spokesperson for hu-
manity (Everyman) and as mythic construct. The poem acknowledges that 
the great truths may be ineffable, yet we must nevertheless construct, self-
consciously, those fictions that may hint at "the wonder of our being," the 
obscure Promethean possibilities of the human. Thus the self-consciousness 
of our fiction making cautions us against (mis)taking our myths for immuta-
ble truths. The paradox is, of course, that our myths do tease us out of 
thought, that fixed interpretation is inevitable to us. So Shelley still feels he 
must warn us, even amid the celebrations of the play's final vision, that "we 
are all, finally, unsure of the efficacy of our stories and of our response to 
stories" (111). This uncertainty is yet a virtue, is socially liberating because 
in this poem's IIqualified celebratory mode" there is "room for song and 
hope in the very midst of our frailty" (112). The unmaking of fictions may, 
after all, be the beginning of a new reverence for the truths we cannot cap-
ture and a new chance for a revitalized world. 
i 
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Then again, unmaking may be just unraveling. If the strength of Weis-
man's book is its consistent scholarly sense of itself in the contexts of linguis-
tic critical debate, if it advances that debate usefully by reminding us of the 
recalcitrance of the everyday as an inherent (not epiphenomenal) element in 
Shelley's rhetorical practice, this focus is also the book's limitation. For in 
Weisman's insistence on the "quotidian" (as she obsessively calls it) lurks a 
crypto-idealism that often has her raising issues first developed by Earl Was-
serman, for whom Shelley's career was a persistent struggle with epistemo-
logical problems. Weisman's "quotidian" is to begin with a rather "hollowed 
out" it-ness, presumably referring to a life uncluttered by figuration, or self-
conscious epistemological quests. How could we know this "it"? Or speak 
it? To speak in poetry of that world is inevitably to figure it forth and in a 
sense to know it less for what "it" is than for what it might offer as an occa-
sion for artifice. Weisman's Shelley is troubled by the problem that what "is" 
may itself never be apprehended without being actively figured by human 
activity. But is this a rhetorical or an epistemological problem? Or a moral, 
biographical, or pragmatic (the need to write a consistent poem) problem? Is 
seeing a poet's career as a continuing "problem of the problem" the most 
satisfying or edifying critical stance? 
Weisman does not make these distinctions clear enough, I think, because 
she often slides between figuration as an aesthetic act and as a mental act. 
"Fiction" for her is both a kind of "trope" of art, an element of texts, and a 
mental process of poets and readers. Except at certain points (notably her 
discussion of utopianism in Prometheus Unbound), the transition of "fiction" 
from mental act to public discourse is one problem she poorly traces, suggest-
ing this but rarely pursuing it. She seems to find comfort within the Moebius 
world of Shelley'S endless epistemological problema tics. 
It may seem like carping, but I found her Shelley wearisome. He worries 
endlessly about the narcissism of refiguring the world into "his" fictions, but 
then (fearing the obduracy of the world as much as loving its beauty) em-
braces those fictions, however insubstantial, often as his only comfort. It is 
hard to know whether this portrait is not itself a fiction following rather 
inevitably on the cleverly consistent but narrow focus of the book. In that 
sense the book is an ounce too clever. It is also a pound or two overwritten. 
Some, at least, of the ambigUity I mention above stems from the overuse of 
the term "trope" (as noun or verb, by my pedantic count, 78 times in 211 
pages). Even in this book relatively free of jargon, many of her sentences are 
turgid: of the opening of "Mont Blanc," we hear that the first lines 
would have it that "things," and their effeel on the mind, form the 
poet's point of departure; however, it quickly becomes obvious that 
the universe of things is a trope for the Arve River and that the mind 
is a trope for the ravine of Arve-a strange situation given that the en-
tire Arve scene is itself a trope for many of the philosophical concep-
tions of the poem, and indeed its actual presence, as a member of the 
real "universe of things," is wholly appropriated to stand for that 
which transcends the universe of things. (58) 
I am not sure the situation is quite so hopeless in these opening lines, or that 
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this improves on readings from Wasserman to Frances Ferguson. Possibly 
some of the epistemological problem here lies in the critic's use of the term 
"trope," since she uses it both for mental act and rhetorical form (does mind 
really trope the way river tropes?). 
For all Weisman's attempt to inject into Shelley criticism a healthy respect 
for his devotion to the everyday, we see little of what that struggle more 
broadly meant in the real everyday. Shelley'S dilemma over fictions was not 
only their, well, fictionality, their ontological emptiness, but also their very 
public fullness. He knew long before Marx did that the myths of the rulers 
become the ruling myths. Shelley did worry over language, but that often 
meant, in the everyday, that he worried over his audience. From another 
critical perspective, Shelley's relation to his audience as a kind of moral trust 
was one of his chief concerns. Steven Jones has written a less ambitious but 
in many ways more original work, studying Shelley'S relationship to the so-
cially sensitive genre of satire, itself a surprising topic. 
One does not think of Shelley as a satirist. In fact, we do not even think of 
him as a wit or as having much sense of humor. Indeed the common wis-
dom is that for satire in the romantic era we must look to Byron-and this is 
perhaps his least "romantic" side. Steven Jones has changed this perception, 
reminding us that humor is not quite the same as satire. It is rare for a book 
in Shelley studies to be so utterly surprising, so revealing of some of the 
poet's most urgent concerns, by focusing on what had seemed a peripheral, 
even failed, portion of his work. 
Jones reminds us that satire is a mode of verbal aggression. If his Shelley 
is as conflicted a figure as Weisman's, it is over the moral ambiguity of his 
satire, in which he well knows that his "(self-)righteous anger fueled by per-
sonal aggression is often just below the surface" (5). The ways in which that 
anger is expressed/concealed in his poetry is bounded within "a particular 
social context," like a gesture, whose form is meaningless outside the con-
crete conventions of particular social life. "All satire is relational, public po-
etry, in particularly delimited and irrecoverable ways" (7). Here Jones's 
perspective is essentially anthropological, drawing not only upon Historicist 
critics but also upon the work of Clifford Geertz, of social historians, and lit-
erary historians of the classical genre of satire. The result is a fascinating and 
informative mix that tells us much about Shelley's conflicted expressions of 
social (and sometimes personal) anger. It also is a highly suggestive example 
of a criticism of concrete origins; since-without being an influence study-it 
reminds us that a rhetoric of concealment or duplicity may be inexplicable 
apart from a study of local shared conventions of gesture, like curses or 
duels. 
From the point of view of either rhetoric or anthropology, satire is a mode 
of cursing, and Jones reminds us that from Shelley's very early (and angry) 
youth the moral ambiguity of the curse was almost an obsession. Scholars 
have long understood the complex refleXivity of Prometheus's curse on Jupi-
ter; Jones generalizes this motif throughout Shelley's work. For the curser is 
cursed himself-in the Romantic version cursed by social isolation. The cur-
ser, says Jones, "is bent on protecting himself against a curse he already 
feels," the curse of being an outsider "with inside knowledge, crying out in 
isolation" (21, 29). Jones sees this pattern in some of Shelley'S most 
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solving the contradictions-either of figuration or of public voice-that con-
dition its own appearance. 111ey will not appeal to the same readers. But 
they are good examples of the directions taken by modern Shelley criticism. 
Northern Illinois University Mark Kipperman 
Annoying the Victorians by James R. Kincaid. London and New York: Rou-
tledge, 1995. Pp. 271. $49.95, cloth; $15.95, paper. 
James Kincaid is a familiar (if not always comforting) name to Victorian-
ists these days. A prolific critic well before the rise of theory, he began his 
career with serious, old fashioned new-critical books on major Victorian 
poets and novelists, and over the years he has kept pace admirably with the 
fashions of literary theory (displaying a special penchant for deconstruction 
and psychoanalytic criticism). Truth to say, Kincaid has actually outdist-
anced these fashions: he is now a maverick who entertains all of us im-
mensely in his role as self-parodic meta critic. One might view him as the 
Oscar Wilde of contemporary Victorian studies. 
The opening of Kincaid's new book declares the subversive, albeit impish 
compulsion behind its production: "My mother said, ... that I should never, 
no matter how bad the times, let myself be dragged down to playing by the 
rules .... The idea [of this book] is to bring some of the rules governing criti-
cal-scholarly-theoretical discourse out into the open, show them a good 
time" (3). The problem in a nutshell, is that "there is so much rectitude 
around that the rules have been made nearly mute .... The rules governing 
what we do within literary discourse wear clothes that are so resolutely fash-
ionable they pass as natural and innocent, do not even register on the eye or 
in the mind." Thus, "the rules need and want denaturalizing ... only reso-
lute criminal activity can do it, and ... I am just the man for the job" (4). In-
deed he is. 
This book, which openly confesses the self-indulgent arbitrariness and nar-
cissism of semiotic, deconstructive, and psychoanalytic critical play reminds 
us that reading and thinking about literature can be outlandish fun-and 
that sometimes the fun might even get us somewhere (a conclusion Kincaid 
would "resolutely" deny). Kincaid's pages are full of zany speculative argu-
ments about his primary texts that just may end up renewing them for us. 
Even Pickwick Papers is reanimated when we learn that "the lustful reader" 
of it is at heart (heart?) a voyeur and that the novel "offers us the next best 
thing to a fleshbath, a kind of porno film we can run in our head," pre-
senting a "relentless barrage of flesh images along with compelling invita-
tions to plunge into them" (28). Similarly, Kincaid's aborted argument for 
the canonicity of the Pearl poems-truncated because "those who demand 
full proof are those who would be unable to recognize proof if it stuck a pipe 
wrench up their nose" (156)-refreshingly spoofs academic concerns about 
canonicity. 
What else is in this book? Thirteen chapters: on Dickens (Pickwick Papers, 
The Old Curiosity Shop, David Copperfield, Great Expectations), Tennyson (In 
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Memoriam), Ryder Haggard (The Return of She), Meredith (Modern Love), The 
Pearl poets, Mary Shelley (Frankenstein), Trollope (Barchester Towers), and 
Hardy (Jude the Obscure)-in short, something for almost everyone. This is 
the case not only in terms of the genres and primary texts discussed but also 
the critical methodologies employed and parodied. Only historicism, which 
Kincaid altogether deplores, is missing. (More on this topic later.) Nine of 
these thirteen chapters are revised from previously published articles, a fact 
that might disappoint some readers. 
Kincaid dwells not only on the subversive fun to be enjoyed by decon-
structive rule-breaking but also focuses, with exuberant eccentricity, on what 
repressed pleasures draw readers (most notably, modern ones) to the texts 
he treats: irrepressible desire, voyeurism, exhibitionism, and the sado-mash-
ochistic delights of child abuse, among other normally proscribed libidinal 
indulgences. Readerly voyeurism in The Old Curiosity Shop, for instance, 
"constitute[s] a kind of competition for Quilp, who is a peeper himself. Voy-
eurs do not work in teams, so he sets Qut to eliminate us by making our gen-
tle, or at least disguised, interest in Nell blatant and grotesque. His open, 
winking, drooling lust after Nell is a way of pointing the finger at us" (44). 
Later on we learn that the true impulse behind Tennyson's In Memoriam is 
an exhibitionism that is "ridiculous, available to ridicule, precisely because it 
lies so deep in most of us" (113). inhabiting this poem, Kincaid finds a 
"Lacanian hollowness" that "is Tennyson's initial dread that his poem may 
have no object: Hallam is dead past all power to be resurrected, and grief, as 
an object has been appropriated by powerful precursors, notably Milton. 
Nonetheless, as the poetic subject (the poet), Tennyson feels a compulsion to 
poeticize .... But what is to be the object of this piping and singing? In his 
anxiety that there is none, Tennyson makes his impulse to pipe and sing it-
self the object, occupying and investing the lost object-position in a strategy 
of poetic exhibitionism" (133). 
One problem with the fun Kincaid is having here is that the poems and 
novels at issue tend to lose their uniqueness as texts and become deconstruc-
tive paradigms. Just as The Old Curiosity Shop is represented as a novel about 
the reader's desire endlessly to perpetuate desire and Frankenstein is seen as 
a self-consciously inarticulate text that focuses the reader's attention finally 
on the play of language, Haggard's Ayesha: The Return of "She" suggests that 
"each act of knowing, all interpretation, seeks not to uncover but to hide the 
truth; or, as I'd prefer to put it, construct the truth as something which is 
always out of reach (tantalizing). Truth would be worthless if we could have 
it" (170). This critical approach leads to Kincaid's recurring argument, that 
"deconstruction doesn't really land one anywhere; it's a cruise, not a device 
for reaching destinations. [It] provides joy in the doing, a way to glimpse 
rather than grasp further possibilities of being and making, of exciting and 
being excited." The goal is to sway" always within desire. The only mistake, 
and it is a fatal one, is to stop" (111). 
Annoying the Victorians redoubles the pleasure of the primary text by add-
ing to it the pleasure of sophisticated serio-comic criticism. What this book 
does not do, however, is add to our understanding of the Victorians or their 
culture or the ways in which the primary texts Kincaid treats operated in 
their Victorian contexts. This, of course, would be the job of historical criti-
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cism, which Kincaid not only eschews, but apparently despises: "Historical 
criticism has been restored to respectability/' he acknowledges in one chap-
ter. "It has slithered back onto our playing field and taken on new shapes, 
even before the reactionary and short-lived (mark my words!) new histori-
cism tried to turn back the clock" (62). For Kincaid, nonetheless, the enemy 
(thanks in part to the work of Susan Horton) is hardly a threat any longer: 
"history is a very uncertain text/' and thus just like the novels and poems 
that allow for the kind of rule-breaking fun Kincaid indulges in here. 
Historicism is without question a deeply problematic critical methodology. 
It rests on two assumptions, neither defensible through rigorous proof: first, 
that something we call history "exists" outside of our narratives of it; and 
second, that history is, in a limited but usable way, recoverable. As Kincaid 
observes, narratives of history are open to the same deconstructive analyses 
that expose the instability of all other texts. Stephen Greenblatt's catchy in-
sistence on the "historicity of texts and the textuality of history" affirms this 
fact. Or as Browning's Pope argued over a hundred years before Greenblatt, 
the truth lies everywhere and nowhere in narratives that are selective and 
partial attempts to represent reality. 
So, what beyond the marshalling and the sophisticated rhetorical deploy-
ment of synchronic materials (not only textual) from past cultures, what be-
yond the discussion of their social institutions, and what beyond 
speculations about the "social energies" that circulated within those cultures, 
do practitioners and audiences of the new historicism-to whom Kincaid is 
viscerally hostile-find so compelling about it? Simply stated, it regenerates 
a world. That is, it opens our eyes to the operations of literary texts within 
plausibly reconstructed historical fields of social and political particulars 
whose relations were previously unknown or opaque to us. 
VVhat Stephen Greenblatt has written in relation to the processes of 
"mobility" and "exchange" that take place in art also applies to the most 
effective deployments of new historical criticism. To paraphrase Greenblatt: 
something happens to objects, beliefs, and practices (espeCially artistic prac-
tices) when they are represented, reimagined, and reconstituted in successful 
historicist critical texts-something often unpredictable and disturbing. That 
"something" signals both the power of those critical texts and their cultural 
embeddedness. After we view Wordsworth through the historicist eyes of 
Jerome McGann, Marjorie Levinson, Alan Liu, or James Chandler, for in-
stance, we may never again read him "innocently," that is, without an 
awareness of the rhetoric of transcendentalist mystification which constitutes 
the central strategy of his poetic attempts to reconstruct the effects upon him 
of the French Revolution and its aftermath. Wordsworth, the nature poet and 
spokesman for the "primary affections of the human heart," we realize, me-
diated a particular set of ideological pressures (of political miscalculation, of 
class, of gender, profession, nation, etc.) by shaping a myth of the self that 
elided or transvalued many of the actual experiences that were pivotal in the 
formation of his own subjectivity. 
If we see Bronte's work through the eyes of Mary Poovey or Tennyson's 
and Browning's through the lens of Isabel Armstrong, we are jolted into a 
wholly new understanding of what that work meant to contemporary read-
ers and what specific political events or cultural contexts determined that 
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meaning for them. Not only does such historicist criticism re-view canonical 
texts and authors, it also opens a space for the retrieval of suppressed or in-
visibilized writers whose recovery may well provide us with a /I disturbing" 
-or exciting-new view of the social operations of literary texts at particular 
historical moments. Pace Kincaid, it is difficult for me to envision the conclu-
sion to such work or to imagine its supersession either by some as yet unfor-
mulated critical methodology or by the rejuvenation of some anterior critidal 
compulsion. This would, needless to say, include Kincaid's serio-comical 
version of deconstruction, delightful as the hours spent on his playground 
might be. 
North Carolina State University Antony H. Harrison 
Impressions of Theophrastus Such by George Eliot, edited by Nancy Henry. 
Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1994. Pp. xli + 187. $24.95. 
It is a healthy circumstance for literary criticism and for the appreciation 
of literature generally when an obscure work by a major writer is made 
available in a modern edition. George Eliot's last published work, Impressions 
of Theophrastus Such, is a minor achievement, but making the work available 
is helpful, especially to scholars who would like an accessible annotated 
copy. As it turns out, an Everyman edition of Impressions, edited by D. j. En-
right, has recently appeared as well. By coincidence, then, this neglected text 
has had unusual recent exposure. Nancy Henry's edition, however, is a 
scholarly edition, with sound notes to support readings of the text and an 
ambitious introduction that attempts to situate Impressions as a pre-Modern-
ist text, self-reflexive and experimental. 
Not much need be said about the textual features of this edition. The book 
is clearly printed, the text is free from errors, and, as mentioned above, the 
notes to the text are instructive. In all regards this is a model of scholarly ed-
iting, though, admittedly, this text involved few complications, such as mul-
tiple editions, multiple manuscript versions, and so forth. What one has to 
deal with, then, is the value of the work itself and the editor's scholarly in-
terpretation of it. I shall take these in reverse order. 
Professor Henry's introduction is a model of shapeliness and ordered ar-
gument. TIle original part of her argument is that "Impressions comes at the 
end of [Eliot's] development as a late Victorian writer of organic form, and 
at the beginning of what looks like early Modernist experimentation through 
fragmentation in form" (ix). Henry later elaborates: "In Impressions George 
Eliot is testing a new form not only to express, but to stage her anxieties 
about the perpetuation of a culture which seems to her to be devaluing the 
written word, and therefore the author" (xxxii). In short, Henry wants to 
haul Eliot into the camp of the Modern, to make her a precursor of those 
who experimented with fragmentary form, while facing the cultural di-
lenuna of the devaluation of printed text. Much of the introduction is de-
voted to analyses that support this position. Hence the essays about writing 
and authorship are depicted as reflexive, almost post-modern, perceptions 
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about a world that has become all text. Accordingly, the title Impressions of 
Theophrastus Such, refers not only to intellectual responses to events, but the 
actual pressure of typeface to paper, creating an "impression" which stands 
for the author's views. Moreover, the narrator of these essays can be seen as 
offering an "impression" or imitation of the original Greek Theophrastus, 
who invented the genre of the II character." Henry carries this notion to an 
extreme when she declares that the Such in Theophrastus' name comes from 
the stylized introduction to the original Theophrastus' characters toiontos tis, 
hoios, which, she says, translates as "such a type who." Thus Theophrastus is 
"Such a type" himself. This is all exciting play in the postrnodem pen, where 
we have learned that all the world is a text and where even biological scien-
tists now offer us DNA as just another text or code in a universe of informa-
tion processing. 
But this exciting play must be tempered by sober reflection. Let us begin 
with names. Whatever Eliot's Such may mean, the tradition of translating 
toiontos tis, hoios, does not emphasize "such," but runs more to lithe sort of,u 
as in the Loeb Classical Library translation. Henry offers no evidence that 
the translations Eliot knew and used translated as "such." Also, since the 
characters that Theophrastus refers to are almost all Greek or Roman types 
(such as Lentulus and Mordax) or symbolic (such as Touchwood and Gram-
pus), there is no reason to suppose that Theophrastus himself is not a generic 
type as well, especially in view of his statement that all the faults he finds in 
others he possesses himself. 
Then let us consider the pre-Modem nature of the essays. Henry does not 
mention that Impressions strongly resembles a work from the very beginning 
of Eliot's career "Poetry and Prose, From the Notebook of an Eccentric" 
(1846--47). The same oddity, the same concern with the craft of writing ap-
pear in the early work as in the later. So the suggestion that Eliot was mov-
ing into a new form and a new attitude could be countered with an assertion 
that she was falling back upon the assumptions she had begun with. Impres-
sions could thus be seen not as a breakthrough document, but as a weary re-
trogression. Moreover, the form that Eliot chose was by no means 
unfamiliar. Bulwer-Lytton had recently published his collection of essays en-
titled Caxtoniana (1863), containing a number of widely ranging essays, but 
which included essays such as "On the Moral Effect of Writers" and "On Es-
say-writing in General, and these Essays in Particular." Also, Thackeray, not 
so many years ago, had had enormous successes with collections of essays, 
presumably the products of very self-conscious "authors," in The Book of 
Snobs, and, perhaps more Significantly, The Roundabout Papers. In these works 
a constructed male identity comments on the frailties of those around him, 
while admitting his own affiliation with those weaknesses. The Book of Snobs 
even owes a debt to the Theophrastian character. 
Henry has tried to rehabilitate Impressions of Theophrastus Such with some 
fancy modem critical maneuvers. But these maneuvers, when confronted 
witl1 the historical context of Eliot's actual production, seem thin and uncon-
vincing. Similarly, the neglected Impressions, now available for careful peru-
sal in a modern edition, itself appears thin, justifying the lukewarm 
assessments of critics from the time they were first published until the pres-
ent. The essays tl1emselves have very little that is original. Much of what 
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Eliot had to say was commonplace in her day. The more original elements 
have been extracted from Impressions and reprinted-specifically autobio-
graphical reflections and speculations on Jewislu1€ss. After all, despite Hen-
ry's admirable efforts to resurrect an obscure text by a major writer, the 
obscurity of the text reasserts itself. And perhaps this is one of the healthier 
byproducts of re-representing such texts to a modern public. Modem readers 
have an opportunity to reassess them in the light of modern thinking. Main-
ly, I suspect, the critical estimate will remain the same. And for those who 
tmderstand the literary and historical context out of which Impressions 
emerged, the little novelty that a modem, ahistorical reading provides, dis-
appears as well and we have left what we began with-the minor reflections 
of a major talent. 
Wayne State University John R. Reed 
The Contingency of Theory: Pragmatism, Expressivism, and Deconstruction by 
Gary Wihl. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994. Pp. xiii + 
215. $27.50. 
Although superb in many respects, recent efforts to determine the relation-
ship between philosophy and literature such as those of Anthony Cascardi, 
Richard Eldridge, Alexander Nehamas, and Martha Nussbaum have been 
characterized, according to Gary WihI, by an apparent indifference to the 
profound shifts which have taken place in literary studies over the past 
twenty years under the general heading of "textuality." Failure to engage 
with the insights of those working most intimately with literary language 
has had the unfortunate effect, Wihl says, of impoverishing the philosophical 
consideration of the importance of literature while stranding debate over de-
construction and other literary theories associated with textuality at what he 
calls "a nonproductive level of inaccurate, occasionally superficial expres-
sion" (xi). In his ambitious articulation and refinement of a number of con-
temporary theories of language, Wihl seeks to raise the level of that debate 
by demonstrating the power of highly textual theories, and particularly de-
construction, to sharpen the way we think about the place and function of 
literature in plural, democratic societies. 
In his book's most broad gesture, Wihl triangulates three contemporary 
philosophical positions on language: those of pragmatism, deconstruction, 
and the expressivism of Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor. No simple 
synthesis, however, Wihl's work places these theories in relationships of dy-
namic and reciprocal modification, constructing a "circuit of inquiry" (60) in 
which positions supplement one another while moving the argument to-
wards an increasingly refined determination of the forms of relatedness (as 
opposed to identity) which are constitutive of the coherency and values of 
the human agent. In a sense, the entire circuit, from Richard ROTty through 
writings by Taylor, Stanley Cavell, William Empson, Stanley Fish, Fredric 
Jameson, Paul de Man, and a host of other figures, forms a complex detour 
by which Wihl elaborates the relationship betvveen pragmatism and decon-
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struction while avoiding the trap of a vague and uncritical identification of 
the two into which pragmatists, eager to embrace deconstruction for its n011-
foundationalist element, have frequently stumbled. Wihl obstructs the possi-
bility of such generalizations by interposing Taylor's notion of expressivism 
directly between pragmatism and deconstruction as a sort of bridge which, 
while connecting the two, also underscores their important differences. Thus, 
while expressivism,'s interest in the interpretive moment marks an area of 
concern it shares with pragmatism, its emphasis on personal identity as the 
expression of specific contrasts of meaning and value constitutes a rough 
equivalent to the careful scrutiny of the contrasting forms of language within 
a text which is a crucial characteristic of deconstruction. Mediated by the ex-
pressivist consideration of those moments of decision in which the human 
agent is situated between different types of language, the deconstructive 
analysis of inconunensurable linguistic forces supplements and modifies the 
reduction of language to monolithic utterances of belief, such as what Wihl 
finds in the writings of a pragmatist such as Stanley Fish. 
Perhaps the most remarkable feature of Wihl's book, however, is the re-
lentless rigor with which it maintains its focus on texts as sites of relatedness 
rather than as neutral reflections of preestablished "social and cultural foun-
dations" (ix). All texts are bridges between other texts in Wihl's circuit of in-
quiry, loci of similarity and difference which supplement and modify other 
texts as they themselves are modified. Just as Wihl resists any easy synthesis 
of pOSitions, no text forms a final link in his chain of readings: each enriches 
the notion of textuality and its relation to the plurality of options among 
which the agent is situated and among which he or she must choose. Wihl, 
for example, enhances the picture of the expressivist dimension of decon-
struction by way of a sequence of linked readings of theorists who define 
textuality in increaSingly specific terms. Thus, with its emphasis on the rela-
tionship between critical decision making and linguistic heterogeneity, the 
work of Stanley Cavell offers a bridge between Taylor'S expressivism and 
such highly textual theories as those of Jameson and de Man. But just as 
Cavell's position supplements Taylor'S somewhat idealistic representation of 
language, Wihl finds that Cavell's "surprisingly uncritical" (83) analysis of 
linguistic discontinuity must be qualified by readings of various literary the-
orists who, with greater and greater precision, examine the construction of 
"a linguistic moment that may be defined as textual" (96), a task which Wihl 
argues culminates (although does not conclude) in the deconstructive ap-
proach of Paul de Man. 
As "the most highly determined theory of textuality thus far developed in 
the literary disciplines," (159), de Manian deconstruction, and particularly 
the consideration of the material dimension of language which we find in 
such late essays as "Hegel on the Sublime" which Wihl reads here, offers a 
bridge between textual conceptions of language and the possibility of human 
agency which antiformalist critics say such theories limit or exclude. Far 
from being the Gorgon whose gaze petrifies agency as critics of deconstruc-
tion frequently contend, deconstructive undecidability figures in Wihl's book 
as the most precise determination available of the incommensurability of the 
options among which the human agent is situated and which constitute the 
grounds of his or her personal coherency. Wihl suggests that, in mapping the 
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textual moment in which multiple elements of language come into conflict, 
deconstruction actively determines and constructs-rather than merely lo-
cates "on the assumption that it must already exist in the work of literature" 
(96)-a decision, much in the same way that choice is constructed in Taylor's 
expressivisrn. Agency in such a theory emerges not in the decisions of an al-
ready embodied speaker (as WiN finds in Fish) but rather in the actual event 
of differentiation which is the condition of possibility of textuality and thus 
of the construction of a choice. In this liminal moment, agency is thoroughly 
imbricated WiUl the material element in languge which de Man explores in 
his last essays. Constitutive of relativeness, this nonphenomenal dimension 
of what comes to bear less and less resemblance to what we perhaps too fa-
miliarly call language, is the condition of possibility of a decision. 
As Wihl notes, de Man failed to state the philosophical implications of his 
idiosyncratic version of deconstruction. One result of this omission has been 
the hostility and neglect his work has suffered from those who associate de-
construction and other theories of textuality with nihilism and skepticism. 
With The Contingency of Theon}, however, WiN seeks to supplement this lack 
in de Man's work by demonstrating that "the crucial decisions enacted with 
the complex language of texts" have "a direct bearing on human identity 
and personhood" (xii). As the literary theory which, according to Wihl, offers 
the most rigorous consideration of textuality, de Manian deconstruction 
presents the possibility of refining our picture of such decisions and their re-
lation to the construction of human selves in plural societies. In building 
bridges between some of de Man's most provocative ideas and the positions 
of other contemporary philosophies of language which either ignore decon-
struction, dismiss it, or consider it only insofar as it may be assimilated to 
their purposes, Wihl shows the way for new and productive considerations 
of textuality, human agency, and the crucial space between them. That he is 
able to construct these bridges through an approach which is largely decon-
structive is itself evidence of the power of textual theories to refine and mod-
ify thought in these areas. 
McMaster University Robert Alexander 
Memory, History, and the Extermination of the Jews of Europe by Saul Friedlan-
der. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993. Pp. 160. 
$24.95. 
In the Introduction to this collection of essays, written between 1985 and 
1992 for a variety of journals and other volumes, Saul Friedlander frames all 
that follows with Eric Hobsbawm's words: "For all of us there is a twilight 
zone between history and memory; between the past as a generalized record 
which is open to relatively dispassionate inspection and the past as part of, 
or background to, one's own life ... " (vii). Perhaps nobody has navigated 
this "no-man's land of time" better than Saul Friedlander, who over the last 
thirty years has combined the scrupulous rigor of historical inquiry into the 
--------------------------------~ 
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Holocaust with the keenly self-conscious eye of one whose life was forged in 
its history. 
But in a characteristically gentle departure from historical thinkers like 
Maurice Halbwachs, Pierre Nora, Yasef Haim Yerushalmi, and others, Fried-
lander has concluded tllat the opposition between memory and history is far 
from clear-cut. On the one hand, Friedlander concedes we must continue 
distinguishing between public memory and historiography, and that "the 
process involved in the molding of memory is, theoretically at least, antithet-
ical to that involved in the writing of history. Nonetheless," he continues, 
the representation of a recent and relevant past has to be imagined as a 
continuum: the constructs of public-collective memory find their place 
at one pole, and the" dispassionate" historical inquiries at the opposite 
pole. The closer one moves to the middle ground, that is, to an attempt 
at general interpretations of the group's past, the more the two areas--
distinct in their extreme forms-become intertwined and interrelated. 
(vii) 
Given his own background as so exquisitely wrought in When Memory 
Comes, this kind of histOriographical positioning cannot corne as a surprise. 
That Friedlander can sustain this self-reflective stance as well as build on it 
is testament to his own powers as both historian and interpreter of Holo-
caust history. 
At the same time, one feels that Friedlander has arrived at this position 
somewhat unwillingly, his hand forced by the impossible claims of post-war 
German historians in their quest for a "rational historiography" of the Nazi-
era. In Memory, History, and the Extermination of the Jews of Europe, Friedlander 
does not attempt to offer an easy answer to what he terms the "insoluble 
choice between the inadequacy of traditional historiographical representation 
[of the Holocaust] and the need to establish as reliable a narrator as pos-
sible." Rather, these essays represent an ongoing attempt to work through 
this dilemma, to paint in the subtle shades of meaning and consequences 
surrounding both the German historians' debate, in particular, and the larger 
ethical and phenomenological issues attending all historical interpretations 
of the Holocaust. 
Toward this end, Friedlander opens this collection with a piece he wrote 
on "German Struggles with Memory" for Geoffrey Hartroan's edited vol-
ume, Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective (1986). In some ways, the Ger-
man memorial and historiographical predicament as Friedlander so 
succinctly describes it is as intractable as it is emblematic of any culture's at-
tempts to assimilate the Holocaust: "the Nazi past is too massive to be for-
gotten, and too repellent to be integrated into the 'normal' narrative of 
memory." As a result, the German debate proves to be especially instructive 
for all historians of the Holocaust, Jewish or otherwise. In this context, Fried-
lander explores the historical understanding underlying the great range of 
public responses to the Nazi past in Germany, from GolD Mann's defensive 
argument against remembering the May 8 capitulation in "Commemorations 
that Reopen Wounds" to Richard von Weizsacker's courageous demand that 
Germans stand face to face with their past; from Rudolf Augstein's cynical 
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relativization of Nazi crimes to Cardinal Joseph Hoffner's self-exculpating 
assertions that "All guilt is abolished in the mercy of Jesus Christ." The im-
plication here is that given the Germans' excruciatingly ambivalent relation-
ship to their past, a fiasco like President Ronald Reagan's visit to the 
cemetery at Bitburg was inevitable. 
This 1985 essay is then followed in Chapter 2 by the first of three succeed-
ing chapters on the "Historikerstreit," in which Friedlander first outlines the 
terms of the German historians' debate and then analyses its consequences 
for public memory. Rather than paraphrasing and thereby reducing the argu-
ments of the main players In this debate, Friedlander wisely allows the ac-
tual words of Ernst Nolte, Andreas Hillgruber, and Joachim Fest to indict 
their authors. In each case, Friedlander shows that even though 
"responsibility of the Nazis in exterminating their victims in not denied ... , 
it is [ j balanced against the responSibility of the Red Army for the crimes 
committed on German soil" (p. 33). Indeed, in the case of Nolte's notoriously 
incendiary contribution to the fray, only his words can begin to suggest the 
dimensions of his argument: 
He who does not want to see Hitler's annihilation of the Jews in this 
context [communist annihilationismj is possibly led by very noble mo-
tives, but he falsifies history. In his legitimate search for the direct 
causes, he overlooks the main precondition without which all these 
causes would have remained without effect. Auschwitz is not primar-
ily the result of traditional anti-Semitism. It was in its core not only a 
If genOcide," but was above all a reaction born out of the anxiety of the 
annihilating occurences of the Russian revolution ... (34) 
In effect, the Nazis' extermination of the Jews was merely the acting out of 
their own anguish "at the idea of being themselves potential victims of the 
Red Terror." 
Although these kinds of arguments were noisily and effectively refuted by 
a number of leading German historians and philosophers (including Eber-
hard Jackel, Christian Meier, Hans Mommsen, Martin Broszat, Hans-illrich 
Wehler, and Jtirgen Habermas), a fundamentally insoluble conundrum un-
derlying the entire debate still haunts Friedlander. This is the very process of 
historicization, as crippling for a stable historical narrative of events as it is 
inevitable. It is precisely the truth of Joachim Fest's afterword that most dis-
turbs Friedlander, even as it eludes easy rejoinder. In pleading for a consen-
sus view of the Holocaust, Fest writes, critics of the revisionists "not only 
plead for a static image of the Nazi regime, but also fight against the passage 
of time, which makes them into defenders of a lost cause" (37). Friedlander 
grants what he calls the ucommon wisom of the historian" in these lines, but 
he also points to where such wisdom leads: back to the insidlous relativism 
of Nolte and Hillgruber. 
At this juncture, in fact, Friedlander must address the central dilemma 
underpinning what he eventually calls the "unease of historical interpreta-
tion": do we continue to search for the single, most persuasive and perma-
nent interpretation of these events? Or do we allow these events to be reread 
and renarrated over the passage of time, a process that Simultaneously ani-
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mates historical memory, even as it necessarily generates a constant evolu-
tion and revision of historical memory? By extension, can we allow the 
historicization of the Holocaust and at the same time assert its exceptional-
ity? For most of the remainder of this volume, Friedlander meticulously ex-
plores the complicated balance of these questions, even as he gradually 
suggests that historicization of the Holocaust and its exceptionality necessar-
ily exclude each other. 
In the next chapter, "The Shoah in Present Historical Consciousness," the 
terms Friedlander uses as guiding criteria for finding meaning in the Shoah 
remain deliberately, if uncharacteristically, soft. "Since the end of the war," 
he writes, "notwithstanding our considerable increase in historical knowl-
edge, the catastrophe of European Jewry has not been incorporated into any 
compe/lillg framework of meaning in public consciousness, either within the 
Jewish world or on the Western cultural scene in general" (43, emphaSiS 
added). As Friedlander makes clear, for example, he is persuaded by neither 
the interpretations of the Shoah implicit in a traditional religiOUS framework 
of "catastrophe and redemption," nor by those meanings suggested in its Zi- 'I 
onist corollary, "catastrophe and heroism." Neither do American idealiza-
tions of the Holocaust move him very far, though here he chooses not to ! 
dwell on the multiplicity of interpretations inherent in the Americanization 
of the Holocaust, including its embodiment of all that seems to counter-point 
America's own reasons for being-such as liberty, refuge, egalitarianism, 
and tolerance. 
In fact, for Friedlander, the issue goes beyond convincing frameworks for 
meaning: how to resolve what he calls "the major discrepancy between 
memory and the absence of its general cultural impact" (52)? That is, not 
only have a priori systems of meaning failed to provide a single compelling 
significance in events, but the events seem to have had almost no impact on 
the culture at large: on the arts, literature, or surrounding intellectual dis-
course. Having already discussed some of these issues in Reflections on Naz-
ism: All Essay Oil Kitsch and Death, Friedlander does not pursue this as far as 
he might have here. On the one hand, it's true that unlike World War I, the 
Holocaust has resulted in no new literary forms, no startling artistic break-
throughs; for all intents and purposes, it has been assimilated to many of the 
modernist innovations already generated by the perceived rupture in culture 
occasioned by the Great War. On the other hand, what has certainly changed 
is the redemptory promise that traditionally underlay innovation and 
"newness" in modern art and culture: where anti-realist and fragmentation 
motifs were seen as redemptory of art's purpose after the Great War pre-
ciselv because they refused to affirm the conditions and values that made 
sud; terror possible, art and literature after the Holocaust are, as Friedlander 
makes clem, <lggressively anti-redemptory of either themselves or the catas-
trophe they represent. 
In Friedlander's \'iew, this means that even the ironic and experimental re-
~pllnses to the Sho<lh <Ire also necessarily inadequate, insofar as their trans-
grt..'.%in.'IlL'ss secms to undercut any and all meaning, verging on the 
nihilistic. But in fact, in arguing ag<linst a post-modem aesthetics a sentence 
l'.1flier, Friedbnder mn)' also mnke a case for it: a post-modem aesthetics 
.1pplied III the Shoah, hI.' says, "would be to accentuate the dilemmas." E\·cn 
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by Friedlander's terms, this is not a bad thing: an aesthetics that remarks its 
own limitations, its inability to provide eternal answers and stable meaning. 
Partly ironic, partly straightforward, works in this vein acknowledge both 
the moral need to bear positive witness and the impossibility of doing so in 
art and literature. In short, post-modern responses devote themselves pri-
marily to the dilemmas of representation, their difficulty and their irresolva-
bility. 
In the next three chapters on the "historicization of the Holocaust," Fried-
lander seems to resist both the traditional forms of historical inquiry and 
their alternatives. On the one hand, he finds an unacceptable relativization of 
Nazi and others' war crimes in the historians' attempt to contextualiz€ the 
Holocaust in its time and place; moreover, once understood in context, the 
Holocaust seems to be inevitable, an apparently natural effect of many 
causes. But the dangers in dehistoricizing the Holocaust are also clear: when 
torn apart from its surrounding events, the Holocaust is also rent from mem-
ory itsel( it becomes a metahistorical event, mystified and obscurred. 
The dilemma comes into especially sharp focus when Friedlander looks 
specifically at what happens when the Holocaust is submerged in the sea of 
other longitudinal processes preceding and following the war. How do we 
talk about the social welfare reforms such as social security and women's 
emancipation developed during the 1920's and 1930's, which continued 
throughout the war and after? In the historicization of the Nazi-period, these 
too are relevant topics, subject to the same historical methods as those ap-
plied to the Nazis' killing machinery. Friedlander worries that by including 
the everyday history as such, however, those events (like the mass murder 
of Jews) that set the Nazi-regime apart from all others are lost beneath a wel-
ter of competing details. Once again, Friedlander articulates best the puzzle: 
"During the Nazi era, few domains-with the exception of direct criminal 
activities-can be considered as entirely abhorrent; on the other hand, very 
few domains can be considered as entirely untouched by some of the objec-
tionable or even criminal aspects of the core" (73). The answer for Friedlan-
der is the degree of relativization achieved in such historicization, which is 
both necessary and dangerous-all of which demands a very finely cali-
brated historical hand. 
Further questions in this vein include: Is the Nazi epoch to be regarded as 
one among others? Or is it to be understood as a time outside the human 
ken, which makes it always already incomprehensible? What weight do we 
give everyday life in Germany during the war? Given the meticulous work 
of historians like Christopher Browning, it could even be said that without 
factoring in everyday life of the killers, calculating a precise moral algebra of 
the Holocaust remains impossible. Moreover, by including many voices, 
even those identifying to some extent with the killers, an ever-larger com-
posite history of the Holocaust emerges, which in and of itself is not a prob-
lem for Friedlander. His difficulties with such historicization arise precisely 
at the point at which the "differential relevance" of such events is lost in 
their contextualization. To counter this, Friedlander argues for an absolute 
self-reflexivity on the part of the historian, "whereby the historian remains 
aware that-whatever his feeling of objectivity may be-he or she is still the 
one who selects the approach, determines the method, and organizes the rna-
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terial according to some kind of agenda" (80). Only then can the specificity 
of the Holocaust within the overall context of war be established, its essen-
tial criminality sustained and not eliminated from human memory (83). 
As insidious as the arguments of Nolte and Hillgruber may be for Fried-
lander, however, they are not a subtle enough foil for the rest of Friedlan-
der's argument. For this, he turns to the much more complex thesis of the 
late Martin Broszat, whose motives for historicization are less troublesome 
than its consequences. At first blush, Friedlander would seem to agree with 
Brosza!'s "search for nuances, for complexity, for differentiation, the fight 
against any kind of mythification or monumentalization of the past" (96). At 
the same time, however, Broszat's "plea for historicization" also includes a 
plea against using the Holocaust "as a golden thread to explain a posteriori 
the motives, methods, and stages of National Socialism" (91). Since it is im-
possible for the victims of the Holocaust to understand the Nazi-regime out-
side the ways it has affected them, Broszat finds that the victims' memory 
obstructs a German rational historiography of the regime. Moreover, he but-
tresses this argument by counterposing what he regards as the rational histo-
ricization of the Nazi-era against the mythification inherent in the Jewish 
memory of Auschwitz. 
Friedlander's response to Broszat's "plea" is double-edged: not only 
would such an historiography provide only a "very small place, in a comer 
of the picture, so to speak, for the full scope of the crimes of National Social-
ism" (91), but the very dichotomy (or "division of labors") Broszat tries to 
establish betw-een "German rational historiography" and the "mythic mem-
ory of the victims" is also untenable. For as Friedlander makes clear at the 
outset of this volume, history and memory are always intertw-ined, each as 
capable of flattening, coarsening, and mythifying this era as the other. 
As becomes clear by the end of this volume, Friedlander's aim here is 
never to answer these questions entirely but only to ensure that they are 
framed in ways that will invite continued reflection and self-critical histo-
riography. Toward this end, the last two chapters on "The Unease in Histori-
cal Interpretation" and "Trauma and Transference" embody beautifully both 
the difficulties and promise in sustaining a Holocaust historiography with 
"negative capability." After Walter Benjamin's "Theses on the Philosophy of 
History," Friedlander wonders whether all historical interpretation, whether 
the very act itself, is somehow fraught with redemptory potential. That is, 
does the very act of making meaning in events like these redeem them with 
significance? And if so, wouldn't it be better to reserve the essential opaque-
ness lying at the core of our historical understanding of the Shoah? Thus will 
Friedlander issue his own plea for an "uncanny" history of the Holocaust, a 
kind that sustains lllcertainty, allows us to live without understanding, to 
understand that we may not understand the Holocaust, after all. 
"Paradoxically," Friedlander writes, "the 'Final Solution,' as a result of its 
apparent historical exceptionality, could well be inaccessible to all attempts 
at a significant representation and interpretation" (113). The problem is, he 
arrives at this point at least partly because he does not want the Holocaust to 
be redeemable by its meanings, and thus justified according to any system of 
inquiry. "Thus," he continues, "notw-ithstanding all efforts at the creation of 
meaning, it could remain fundamentally irrelevant for the history of human-
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ity and the understanding of the 'human condition'" (113). But this in turn, 
raises another, as yet unaddressed question: is it epistemologically possible 
to preserve either the history or memory of the Holocaust without meaning? 
As soon as it is spoken of, it is made meaningful at some level, no matter 
how subtle. Which leads to another question: is it possible to preserve the 
exceptionality of the Holocaust and to preserve its memory at the same 
time? For if it remains fundamentally irrelevant to the history of humanity 
and the understanding of the human condition, as Friedlander believes, then 
won't it also necessarily fall outside memory, which is always contingent on 
the human condition? 
Fittingly, Friedlander's answers to these questions do not come in flat, 
declarative responses. As he patiently elaborates in his last chapter, hope lies 
instead in the growing trend in both Jewish and non-Jewish literature to-
ward anti-redemptory narratives of the Holocaust: the kind exemplified in 
Claude Lanzmann's Shoah, or Primo Levi's The Drowned and the Saved, or Ida 
Fink's reflections-where irresolution, lack of closure, and uncertainty rule. 
For the historian, this means an historiography whose narrative skein is 
disrupted by the sound of the historian's own, self-conscious voice. 
"Whether this commentary is built into the narrative structure of a history or 
developed as a separate, superimposed text is a matter of choice, but the 
voice of the commentator must be clearly heard," Friedlander writes. In the 
process, "The commentary should disrupt the facile linear progression of the 
narration, introduce alternative interpretations, question any partial conclu-
sion, withstand the need for closure" (132). Moreover, by reintroducing the 
individual's memory into an otherwise "rational historiography," the histo-
rian can also puncture fhe perceived "normality" of Alltagsgeschichte. Such 
interruptions would remind readers that this history is being told and re-
membered by someone in a particular time and place, that it is the product 
of human hands and minds. In this kind of multi-vocal history, no single, 
overarching meaning emerges unchallenged; instead, narrative and counter-
narrative generate a frisson of meaning in their exchange, in the working 
through process they now mutually reinforce. 
Friedlander concludes this volume with the words of Maurice Blanchot: 
"Working fhrough may ultimately signify. 'to keep watch over absent 
meaning.'" But as Friedlander has also made quite clear by now, "working 
through" is not just refUSing to believe in the meanings generated in any 
given narrative. It is also to understand both the necessity for meaning and 
meaning's own necessary contingency. One can only look forward to the 
next installment of Saul Friedlander's working through-with a special curi-
osity about the form (or counter-form) it will take. 
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